Banking and Competition in Exceptional Times
Brett Christophers*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past three years, the world of banking has seen a resurgence
of Western political, regulatory, and scholarly interest in competition
policy in general and competition law in particular. Antitrust is back in
the spotlight. This resurgence of interest comes after a considerable hiatus. To be sure, concerns about levels of competitiveness and potential
oligopoly have surfaced regularly in recent decades: there has been a
persistent flow of both antitrust banking cases and academic studies of
the theory and practice of such legal interventions. However, the antitrust
spotlight has not been so firmly trained on the banking sector for a long
time, arguably since the 1950s. Richard Sylla, among others, has observed that the 1930s to 1950s were notable for an “anti-concentration
attitude” toward banking, especially in the United States.1 Only with the
departure of “Harry Truman and his trust-busting administration” did the
antitrust spotlight begin to dim.2
How can we account for the refocusing of this spotlight? Two connected sets of factors seem to be critical. First, there is a widespread perception among politicians, regulators, and the general public—indeed,
among almost everyone except certain sections of the banking community—that today’s largest banks have become “too big to fail” (TBTF).
Might, then, antitrust have a role in cutting such banks down to a size
where the systemic risks deemed to be associated with being TBTF can
be meaningfully diminished? Second, there are concerns regarding what
has happened to banking competition both during the recent global financial crisis and indeed in the period leading up to it. With allegedly
TBTF banks tottering precariously, antitrust scrutiny was relaxed and
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emergency consolidation encouraged in a number of different territories
at the height of the crisis. With the benefit of hindsight, how might this
consolidation be conceptualized and potentially revisited? And is there a
case to be made that antitrust was not doing its job properly in the years
and decades preceding the crisis? How could banks have become TBTF
in the first place if antitrust was working effectively?
Situated in this context, this Article has two main aims: to provide a
critical consideration of this contemporary antitrust “revival” from an
explicitly political–economic perspective and to point toward some theoretical resources that might facilitate such an assessment.
Part II looks backward at the evolution and application of competition law in the banking sector over the relatively longue durée. In this
Part, I invoke the concept of “exception” to understand how antitrust
policy has developed, and my chief interlocutors are the perhaps unlikely
figures of Giorgio Agamben and Karl Marx. Part III looks forward and
considers the central question around which the recent resurgence of
interest in antitrust ultimately revolves: can (and should) antitrust law
help in tackling the TBTF problem? The tentative conclusion is that unless we are prepared to fundamentally rethink the purpose of competition
law—and in relation to this, the nature of capitalist competition itself—
then the answer must be no. This is not because (as some commentators
have argued) TBTF is not an antitrust issue. Rather, it is because antitrust
theory and practice are today thoroughly economized, whereas the competition between large banks appears to be largely non-economic. In
making this argument, I appeal not to Agamben and Marx, but to Paul
Baran and Paul Sweezy, and most directly of all to the theorist whose
name this symposium bears, Adolf Berle.
II. BANKING, ANTITRUST, AND STATES OF EXCEPTION
The years 2008 and 2009 saw several extremely high-profile emergency bank mergers in some of the world’s most important banking markets. This included Lloyds TSB with HBOS in the UK and at least three
major mergers in the United States: Bank of America with Merrill
Lynch, J.P. Morgan with Bear Stearns, and Wells Fargo with Wachovia.
These mergers would have been expected to face close antitrust scrutiny
under “normal” conditions. In the event, none did, with conditions being
relaxed and special clauses—for example, a “national interest” clause in
the Lloyds HBOS case—being invoked.3
3. For discussion of this burst on consolidation, specifically in the context of competition law,
see, for example, Xavier Vives, Competition Policy in Banking, 27 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 479
(2011); Robert P. Zora, The Bank Failure Crisis: Challenges in Enforcing Antitrust Regulation, 55
WAYNE L. REV. 1175 (2009).
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A. States of Exception
One way to theorize these emergency measures in political–
economic terms would be to follow the lead of the urban politicaleconomist Phillip Ashton. In a recent paper, Ashton draws on
Agamben’s notion of the “state of exception” to argue that emergency
state interventions during financial crises have become productive moments for credit risk, securing broader norms of risk-taking by selecting
out and effectively socializing problematic loans.4 In other words, the
state utilizes the emergency situation to take exceptional measures to
reinforce, rather than reconfigure, the existing logics of capitalist finance.
Accordingly, can we approach the recent crisis as a comparable moment
of “exception” for antitrust: one during which abnormal practices were
taken or enabled in order to further entrench existing political–economic
structures and processes?
Since not much seems to have changed in the world of finance and
its governance, maybe we can. However, I would argue that to apply
Ashton’s framework to banking and competition policy would be to misread both the crux of Agamben’s thesis and the late-twentieth-century
history of antitrust enforcement. The originality of Agamben’s thesis is
in his assertion that over the course of the twentieth century, the state of
exception became anything but exceptional. It became normal: the relaxation or suspension of “normal” legal relations became nothing less than
the paradigm of modern government.5 This, on my reading, would actually represent a far more accurate conceptualization of competition policy in the banking sector during the two or three decades preceding the
financial crisis. This period appears, in retrospect, as an extended state of
exception from the putative long arm of antitrust law. Consolidation proceeded apace in all the major Western banking markets as regulators and
competition authorities waved through one major merger after another.6
The mergers of the crisis period represented a continuation of, rather than
exceptional departure from, this trend.
This begs an obvious question: How can we understand such an extended state of exception in regard to competition law and banking?
Three possible explanations can be identified. The first two concern the
methodology of late-twentieth-century antitrust law, one in a generic and
international context and one relating specifically to banking, and specifically in the United States. The generic methodological factor can best be
4. See generally Philip Ashton, The Financial Exception and the Reconfiguration of Credit
Risk in US Mortgage Markets, 43 ENV’T & PLAN. A 1796 (2011).
5. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005).
6. See Tim McCarthy, Refining Product Market Definition in the Antitrust Analysis of Bank
Mergers, 46 DUKE L.J. 865, 865 (1997); Shull, supra note 1, at 283–84; Vives, supra note 3, at 482.
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conceived in terms of the neoclassicization of antitrust. As the principles
and practices of competition law came to be dominated by neoclassical
economic approaches from the late 1970s, monopoly—or oligopoly—
lost some of its historical illegitimacy. Increasingly, the singular objective of antitrust law was defined as the promotion of economic welfare
through a focus on allocative efficiency. Crucially, under such an approach, monopoly becomes admissible since it is only presumptively
inefficient: monopoly can be more efficient than competition where the
economies of centralizing production outweigh the costs of monopoly
pricing. Thus, as efficiency considerations were layered over traditional
market share and market concentration measures, mergers that threatened
potential monopoly could be more comfortably authorized. “After
Ronald Reagan took office in 1981,” claims Barry Lynn, “his new head
of antitrust enforcement, William F. Baxter, swiftly abandoned efforts to
promote competition and promised instead a policy ‘based on efficiency
considerations.’”7
Alongside this wider neoclassical reformulation of antitrust, American antitrust authorities made decisions concerning the treatment of
commercial banking that I, as a geographer, find particularly salient. All
antitrust investigations require both geographic and product market definitions. To assess whether an existing or merged corporate entity might
enjoy market power, the market in question—its product or service form
and its geographical extent—must first be delimited. U.S. commercial
banks, it was decided, competed with one another locally.8 This was a
crucially important geographical determination in terms of its implications for antitrust investigations of the bank sector. A problematic merger
proposal was one that threatened high levels of concentration at the local
scale—not at the national scale—because commercial banks ostensibly
did not compete nationally. The result was that numerous relatively small
bank mergers were blocked on the grounds that local competition might
be curtailed. Meanwhile, the authorities approved much larger mergers

7. Barry C. Lynn, Killing the Competition: How the New Monopolies Are Destroying Open
Markets, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 2012, available at http://harpers.org/archive/2012/02/0083788. In a
similar vein, Mark N. Cooper, the Director of Research at the Consumer Federation of America,
recently argued in testimony to the United States Congress concerning competition policy specifically in banking that U.S. antitrust in recent times “has given far too much deference to efficiency at the
expense of competition.” See ‘Too Big to Fail?’: The Role of Antitrust Law in Government-Funded
Consolidation in the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition
Policy of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 111–33 (2009) [hereinafter ‘Too big to fail?’
Hearing] (statement of Mark N. Cooper).
8. The key decision to this effect was the 1963 case United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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that materially increased national levels of market concentration, but
which were perceived as harmless at the all-important local level.9
But the extended state of exception, which I suggest characterized
banking under competition law in the decades leading up to the financial
crisis, was perhaps not only a matter of methodological reformulation
and refinement. It must also be placed within a much longer history of
widely varying approaches to competition policy in the finance sector.10
Competition has, at certain junctures, been minimally enforced; at other
times, it has been actively discouraged.11 The reason for this is that regulation of the financial sector within capitalism has always been regarded
as a delicate balancing act—ideally fostering competition, but never at
the expense of that other shibboleth of banking propriety: financial stability.12 When stability has been seen as paramount (and not only during
times of perceived crisis), competition has been actively dampened. And
while some historians might argue that the period from the 1970s
through 2007 was one in which the balance of regulatory priorities was
in favor of competition, stability concerns have never been entirely absent. Indeed, the influential British economic commentator John Kay
recently claimed in the Financial Times that “throughout the 20th century, we maintained stability in British banking through oligopoly, with
minimal competition, no new entry and no banking failure of any significance.”13 Thus, by broadening our historical perspective, we may be
justified in seeing the strongly competition-oriented 1940s and 1950s as
the exception to a wider rule of stability prioritization. From this vantage
point, the disapplication of antitrust during the recent crisis looks entirely
unexceptional; thus, our theorization should not be of an exceptional
period, but of an exceptional (because it is stability-requiring) banking
sector.

9. On the nature and effects of this particular modality of geographic market delimitation, see
‘Too Big to Fail?’ Hearing, supra note 7, at 7, 12 (statement of Albert A. Foer, President, American
Antitrust Institute); Carl Felsenfeld, The Antitrust Aspects of Bank Mergers - Panel Discussion I:
Development of Bank Merger Law, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 511, 512–15 (2008); Shull,
supra note 1, at 285; Katerina Simons & Joanna Stavins, Has Antitrust Policy in Banking Become
Obsolete?, 1998 NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 13, 14 (2003).
10. For an excellent overview of this history, albeit with a strict U.S. focus, see Shull, supra
note 1.
11. Adolf A. Berle, Banking Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 589, 595–98
(1949) (providing several concrete historical examples).
12. On this balancing act, see, for example, Vives, supra note 3.
13. John Kay, It is Time to End the Oligopoly in Banking, FIN. TIMES (May 8, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/da96880a-98f8-11e1-948a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz26awYSdR8.
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B. The Investment Banking Exception
In recent decades, of all areas of the banking industry, an enduring
state of exception from antitrust has been most notable in investment
banking, and additional explanations for banking’s exceptionality are
required here. In other words, efficiency and stability considerations are
not in themselves adequate. This section briefly highlights two explanations specific to investment banking. The first is a matter of historical
failure. In United States v. Henry S. Morgan, the U.S. government famously challenged the major Wall Street investment banks from 1947
through 1953 in a long, costly, high-stakes antitrust case alleging endemic cartel-like behavior—and lost.14 Chastened by this failure, it is perhaps
no wonder that competition authorities in the United States and elsewhere subsequently backed off from the investment banking sector and
left it largely to its own devices, focusing their interventionist energies
elsewhere.
The second and more pertinent explanation (which chimes with an
issue we will consider more closely below) concerns the nature and location of capitalist competition dynamics and how we can conceptualize
these. Generally, the main focus of post-war antitrust law has always
been consumer-facing business activities on the grounds that consumer
economic welfare is and should be such a law’s primary consideration.
Where businesses serve other businesses, especially large businesses,
competition law has been much less vigorously applied. The experience
of the banking sector is typical: substantial antitrust scrutiny into retail
and small-business commercial banking, but relatively little into investment banking. While the “man on the street” requires protection from
unscrupulous monopolistic or oligopolistic commercial banks, the big
companies that represent investment banks’ main customer base do not.
The problem with this dualistic approach is the questionable, linked
assumptions it contains. The first of these is that, in the words of the
British antitrust lawyer Becket McGrath, investment banking customers
are generally “big enough to look after themselves.”15 They can either
resist monopoly pricing or absorb its costs. But the presumption of cost
absorption is itself predicated on an atomistic and not remotely credible
conception of the economy: it assumes that if investment banks charge
their clients monopoly prices, those customers absorb this monopolistic
rent in full; they do not pass any of it on to their own customers. To disa14. Vincent P. Carosso, The Wall Street Money Trust from Pujo Through Medina, 47 BUS.
HIST. REV. 421, 431 (1973).
15. Press Release, Becket McGrath, Partner, Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP, Client Advisory –
Banking in the Antitrust Crosshairs – the EU Situation (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.edwards
wildman.com/newsstand/detail.aspx?news=1905.
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buse ourselves of this particular misconception, we can usefully turn to
Marx. In one of the concluding chapters of the final volume of Capital,
felicitously titled “The Illusion Created by Competition,” Marx scorns
the notion that monopolies somehow transform the law of value. Accumulation and pricing dynamics, he notes, do not play out independently
within what we like to think of as discrete industry “sectors”; rather,
A monopoly price for certain commodities simply transfers a portion of the profit made by the other commodity producers to the
commodities with the monopoly price [here, the investment banking
service]. Indirectly, there is a local disturbance in the distribution of
surplus-value among the various spheres of production, but this
leaves unaffected the limit of the surplus-value itself.16

In other words, the notion that only investment banks’ immediate clients
would be affected by monopoly pricing is based on a fallacy of separate
industry sector economics. In reality, Marx concludes, the monopoly
price is paid from two sources: “from the profit of other capitalists,” and
“by deduction from real wages.”17 Where investment banking is concerned, antitrust has implicitly internalized such transfers.
III. ANTITRUST, TOO BIG TO FAIL, AND THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST
COMPETITION
With this context in mind, how then should we theorize and assess
the recent resurgence of interest in antitrust in the banking context? As I
indicated at the outset, this resurgence is closely bound up with the problem of TBTF: the sense not only that antitrust might help alleviate this
problem, but also that a more rigorous application of antitrust in recent
decades could perhaps have prevented the problem from arising. The
rekindling of antitrust energies is currently apparent in multiple markets,
including the United States and Europe. Indeed, within two months in
mid-2012, two major antitrust-related banking investigations—albeit
investigations not directly concerned with the TBTF phenomenon—
yielded high-profile results. First, in May 2012, in United States v.
Carollo, Goldberg & Grimm, three ex-bankers were found guilty by a
U.S. federal jury of manipulating auctions for municipal-bond investment contracts.18 Five major Wall Street banks, furthermore, have paid
over $700 million to settle claims associated with the same U.S. probe

16. 3 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 1001 (Ernest Untermann trans., Frederick Engels ed., Charles H.
Kerr & Co. 1909 ed. 1894).
17. Id.
18. Drew Fitzgerald, Three Ex-GE Workers Convicted in Bid Rigging, WALL ST. J. (May 13,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304203604577398720070122232.html.
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into the collusive rigging of bids for investing the proceeds of the sales
of such bonds.19
Second, in June 2012, in a settlement with three separate authorities
(the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority and, in the United
States, the Department of Justice and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission), the U.K.-headquartered bank Barclays was fined more
than $450 million for attempting to manipulate the pivotal London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) for interest.20 Once again, this individual
settlement occurred within the context of a much wider, ongoing investigation into alleged antitrust violations and immediately prompted calls
for conclusive answers. Philip Augur wrote in the Financial Times:
We need to know whether several banks were in this together in a
formal or informal ring. If so, such an organised rigging of the market would revive suspicions about the existence of a banking cartel.
If one market was rigged, might there not be others? Regulators
must look again at places where there has been a lack of price competition, for example on new issues and other capital markets business where price protection appears to have been occurring.21

More broadly, influential economic commentators had already issued a
series of high-profile antitrust rallying cries. For example, in early 2010,
a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Simon Johnson,
identified antitrust scrutiny, explicitly of TBTF financial institutions, as
“a sensible idea that is long overdue.”22
A. Differing Views on Antitrust and TBTF Banks
Not surprisingly, some legal scholars and political and regulatory
authorities have been quick to offer opinions on what we can generally
expect of antitrust, specifically vis-à-vis TBTF banks in the post-crisis
19. Bob Van Voris & Martin Braun, Ex-UBS Executives Go to Trial in Bond Bid-Rigging
Case, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 30, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-30/ex-ubs-executivesgo-to-trial-in-bond-bid-rigging-case.html.
20. Brooke Masters, Caroline Binham & Kara Scannell, Barclays Fined a Record £290m, FIN.
TIMES (June 27, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2a4479f8-c030-11e1-9867-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz26gnXAbDN.
21. Philip Augar, Too Big to Manage or Regulate Are What Matter Now, FIN. TIMES (June 28,
2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c2a9609a-c04a-11e1-982d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz26gnXA
bDN; see also Simon Goodley, EU Inquiry Into Claims of Banks’ Collusion in Credit Derivatives
Market, GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/apr/29/bankingcredit-default-swaps-eu-investigation (showing that the European Commission is probing the credit
default swaps market for collusion).
22. Simon Johnson, An Antitrust Investigation of the Banks?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/an-antitrust-investigation-of-the-banks; see also
Krishna Guha, Opening Salvo on Banks Has Yet to Come, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2010),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8302b178-047a-11df-8603-00144feabdc0.html#axzz26gnXAbDN.
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era. Some, mostly from the strict neoclassical tradition, say we cannot
and indeed should not expect much because to make TBTF an antitrust
issue is to misunderstand both. Antitrust, they say, is about competition,
while TBTF is about size, and size per se is not a competition issue.
“TBTF,” avers Lawrence White, “does not represent an instance in
which size involves the exercise of market power.”23
Others are slightly more optimistic. They say that antitrust should
have a role in the fostering of a financial system in which banks are not
TBTF. However, their argument comes with a significant caveat. Antitrust as it is currently configured—specifically, antitrust with the methodological dispositions described in the first part of this Article (in other
words, with strong efficiency considerations, and with a privileging of
the local geographical scale)—is simply not properly equipped to inhibit
big national or even international bank mergers. Important voices have
recently made this case, including Albert Foer, the President of the
American Antitrust Institute.24 For such commentators, antitrust needs
methodological revision to be effective.
Finally, there are those who think not only that TBTF is an antitrust
issue, but also that if scrupulously applied, contemporary antitrust will be
able to do the policing work that it has seemingly failed to do in the past.
Legal scholar Sharon Foster, for instance, points to the powerful possibilities of systemic risk analysis. Foster maintains that such analysis “will
work under current law without the need for legislative amendment nor a
reconsideration of the law by courts.” Thus, “the antidote to too big to
fail is antitrust.”25
With the possible exception of White’s (whose argument I perceive
to be tendentious), all such positions are to one extent or another defensible. Yet critically, they share a certain conservativeness in the scope of
their conceptualization of the issues at hand. Specifically, none venture
beyond relatively narrow framings either of antitrust—what it is, what it
could and should be—or, perhaps more importantly, of the nature of
corporate competition in the banking sector. In the remainder of this
23. “TBTF is not an antitrust issue. It should not become part of an antitrust agenda.” Lawrence J. White, Commentary, Financial Regulation and the Current Crisis: A Guide for the Antitrust
Community 39, 43 (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/AAI%20
White%20COmmentary%20fin%20reg%20and%20antitrust_061120092144.pdf
(recommending
that the existing antitrust approach in banking should be broadly maintained); see also ‘Too Big to
Fail?’ Hearing, supra note 7, at 32 (statement of William Askew, Senior Policy Advisor, Fin. Serv.
Roundtable).
24. ‘Too Big to Fail?’ Hearing, supra note 7, at 12 (statement of Albert A. Foer, President,
Am. Antitrust Inst.).
25. Sharon E. Foster, Too Big to Fail – Too Small to Compete: Systemic Risk Should Be Addressed Through Antitrust Law But Such a Solution Will Only Work If It Is Applied on an International Basis, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 31, 35 (2010).
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Article, I propose a more radical theorization of the pertinent issues, explicitly from a political–economy perspective.
B. Baran, Sweezy, and Berle’s Political Economy
To discuss a more radical theorization of the role of antitrust, we return to two important political–economic interventions from the midcentury. One is Baran and Sweezy’s influential Monopoly Capital, published in 1966. A central tenet of this book is that contrary both to popular beliefs and to the conventions of neoclassical economics, capitalist
firms do not necessarily engage in “real,” price-based competition. Instead, big corporations can be seen to behave toward each other in what
Joseph Schumpeter had called a “corespective” manner, maintaining the
impression of serious competition but in reality refraining from eroding
each other’s profits.26 Explicit price-fixing would be the most egregious
example of such behavior. Baran and Sweezy suggested that this type of
behavior had in fact become the norm within modern capitalism—and
competition, “perfect” or otherwise, a state of exception.27 An “attitude
of live-and-let-live toward other members of the corporate world,” according to Baran and Sweezy, now dominated capitalist microeconomic
affairs.28
Yet for all its impact, this argument was not wholly novel. Twelve
years earlier, Adolf Berle published The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution, a book vastly less influential than his work, The Modern Corporation, and criticized from all sides for its policy recommendations, but
nonetheless brimming with insights regarding the core dynamics of the
corporate world.29 Berle’s starting point was with the high levels of concentration visible in key sectors of the American economy, including
banking. In such a situation, he observed, competition looks very different from “when thousands of tradesmen, craftsmen, or farmers are offering their wares to thousands of customers.” In place of intense price
competition one finds “either consolidation, or elimination of one of the
units, or”—and here again the echoes of Schumpeter are unmistakeable—“acceptance of a situation in which the place of each is approximately respected.” In short, competition is “rarely if ever permitted to
carry through to its logical result. Nobody, it seems, wants that.”30
26. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 90 n.5 (1942).
27. This exception might be considered a complement to the historical regulatory “exception”
of meaningful, competition-oriented antitrust in banking.
28. PAUL BARAN & PAUL SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL: AN ESSAY ON THE AMERICAN
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER 48 (1966).
29. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954).
30. Id. at 45–46, 48.
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This, of course, was very similar to Baran and Sweezy’s later argument. What distinguishes Berle’s thesis, however, is his further development of this observation regarding the lack of price competition.
“[C]ompetition in mid-twentieth century,” he concluded, “leads more
often to a political than to an economic resolution of events.”31 At a certain point, in concentrated industries, economics is set aside and politics
takes over. Berle was so sure of this dynamic that he called it “indefensibly disingenuous to assert that these operations are primarily following
economic laws more or less accurately outlined by the classic economists
a century ago when the fact appears to be that they are following a slowly emerging pattern of sociological and political laws.”32
Interestingly, Berle was something of an expert on antitrust and
competition in banking, and in 1949, he penned a paper in the Columbia
Law Review that anticipated the arguments of The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution, specifically in relation to banking.33 If large corporations
generically did not obey economic laws, then this was especially true, he
believed, in finance. If banking was unique, then for Berle its uniqueness
lay in the fact that a political rather than economic response to competition was, to a degree, necessary: “While competition may be desirable up
to a point in deposit banking, there is a clear bottom limit to its desirability.” He continued: “a high degree of cooperation among banks is essential.”34
As I will suggest shortly, Berle’s theory of the sociopolitical laws
of corporate behavior is tremendously insightful and consequential in the
antitrust context. But was—and is—he right? Do large corporations, and
banks in particular, circumvent the “laws” of price competition? In one
sense the question is rhetorical, because a central purpose of antitrust
practice is precisely to try to answer it. But there are certainly those who
have little doubt (and the recent revelations from the United States v.
Carollo and Barclays LIBOR cases will hardly have shaken their convictions). John Kay, whom I referenced earlier, remarks that in relation to
U.K. commercial banking “we have lost the assurance of stability,” as
the financial crisis demonstrated, yet still “experience fully the disadvantages of oligopoly.”35 U.S. Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee,
speaking at a congressional hearing on banking and antitrust in 2009,
insisted similarly that “the named big banks or the entity big banks are a

31. Id. at 48.
32. Id. at 12.
33. See Berle, supra note 11.
34. Id. at 592.
35. Kay, supra note 13.
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monopoly.”36 Meanwhile, where investment banking more specifically is
concerned, the ex-banker William D. Cohan is an articulate and forceful
proponent of a similar argument. He believes that Wall Street was clearly
a cartel in the mid-twentieth century, notwithstanding Judge Harold Medina’s finding to the contrary in the Morgan case; and he says the business “is an even more powerful and threatening cartel” today than it was
then:
Although banks will argue that all fees are negotiable, every corporate issuer knows the rules: Initial public offerings are priced at a 7
percent fee; high-yield-debt underwriting is priced at 3 percent; loan
syndications are priced at about 1 percent. M&A deals are still
priced off the “Lehman formula,” even though there is no more
Lehman Brothers.37

C. Antitrust, Too Big to Fail, and the Political Economy of Competition
In the context of our consideration of antitrust and TBTF banks, the
significance of Berle’s thesis—and, alongside it, that of Baran and
Sweezy—is simply as follows: Except where direct evidence of collusion
or other manipulative practices is allegedly available as in the Carollo
and Barclays cases (of course, these two cases, in any event, were not
formally geared toward the TBTF issue), contemporary antitrust is in
large measure rendered toothless if large corporations are not following
economic laws because in the past half-century, antitrust theory and
practice has been thoroughly economized. Put bluntly, an economic
framework cannot help address a non-economic problem.
I have already referred to one dimension of this economization of
antitrust—the increasing focus in recent decades on efficiency principles—but it runs far deeper than that development alone. In 1984, Frederick Rowe wrote powerfully of antitrust lapsing “into bondage to economic models” from as early as the 1940s.38 The most important such
model, before neoclassical efficiency concerns arrived on the scene, was
the so-called Oligopoly Model, which posited that “few producers dominating a concentrated market instinctively behaved like one monopolist,”
36. ‘Too Big to Fail?’ Hearing, supra note 7, at 81–82 (statement of Sheila Jackson Lee,
Member, Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy). She continued: “And you can point out to
me what little guy has risen to be a big guy in the last 50 years, short of the big guys buying them up,
and you might say, well, the big guys have now added and so that little guy finally got in. But no,
that little guy was eaten up.”
37. William D. Cohan, Wall Street Turned Crisis Into a Cartel: William Cohan, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-09/cohan-how-wall-street-turned-a-crisisinto-a-cartel.html.
38. Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian
Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1559 (1984).
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and which, in relying on a concept of market power measurable by numerical market shares, crucially “obviated proof of anti-competitive purpose or effect.”39 Even Albert Foer now concedes that “[t]he course of
antitrust has been determined by the Chicago School, where we focus on
microeconomics, and in particular on short-term price effects . . . .”40 But
perhaps the most striking acknowledgement of antitrust’s reduction to
neoclassical economics can be found in the preface to the second, 2001
edition of the textbook written by this tradition’s arguably most prominent advocate and theorist, Richard Posner. “The first edition of this
book [Antitrust Law], published a quarter of a century ago, bore the subtitle ‘An Economic Perspective,’ implying there were other perspectives. . . . In the intervening years, the other perspectives have largely
fallen away”41—as, therefore, did the subtitle.
We began with the question: Can antitrust law ordinarily help us in
tackling the TBTF banking problem? I find myself in the unexpected
position of agreeing with Lawrence White: No, it probably cannot. For
me, however, this is not because TBTF is not an antitrust issue, but because I am personally persuaded by the arguments of Baran and Sweezy
and Berle—that many large corporations, including (though not only) in
banking, tend to avoid price competition at all costs; their rivalry, such as
it is, is largely non-economic. To seriously confront the TBTF problem
and the powers and risks it involves, therefore, antitrust would have to
struggle free of the economistic straitjacket that currently confines and
defines it. It would have to reintroduce some of the non-economic principles—protection of small businesses, for example—that Posner ridicules as political and ideological; as if neoclassical economics is itself
ideology-free and politically neutral.42
IV. CONCLUSION
In Competition, Confusion, and Commercial Banking, Almarin
Philips observed, “The recent interest in competition in the commercial
banking industry is a strange turn of events.”43 But this paper was published not, as one might expect given the allusion to the “recent interest
in competition,” in 2011 or 2012; rather, it was published in 1964.

39. Id. at 1520, 1524.
40. Albert A. Foer, The Antitrust Aspects of Bank Mergers - Panel Discussion I: Development
of Bank Merger Law, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 542, 542–43 (2008).
41. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW vii (2d ed. 2001).
42. Id. at viii.
43. Almarin Phillips, Competition, Confusion, and Commercial Banking, 19 J. FIN. 32, 32
(1964).
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As we have seen, the 1940s and 1950s were an exceptional period
in the history of banking and competition policy insofar as competition,
rather than stability, was prioritized. Philips regarded this turn to antitrust
enforcement as strange precisely because it occurred against the backdrop of a long history of pursuing stability. More pointedly, Phillips conjectured that antitrust investigations into banking were and would likely
remain a case of “tilting at windmills” because “non-price forms of rivalry” were so embedded—sometimes covertly, but often overtly and legitimately.44 Given my own comparable diagnosis of the current conjuncture, at a moment of similar heightening of interest in antitrust, I will
leave the last word to Phillips in the form of this wonderfully wry and
piercingly apt observation: “Fears of monopoly and of a substantial lessening of competition have arisen with regard to an industry which hitherto few had regarded as competitive in the first place.”45

44. Id. at 33, 40.
45. Id. at 32.

